This paper explores how firms with different stakeholder structures choose their assets and liabilities and how they perform as economic entities. Our data from the Norwegian banking industry shows that ownerless firms are smaller, charge higher prices, and take on less risk than stockholder-owned firms, whereas partially stockholder-owned firms fall in between. Such behaviour is as expected when stakeholders use their control rights to make the firm behave in ways they prefer. More surprisingly, ownerless firms are not outperformed by firms fully or partially controlled by stockholders. This finding questions the critical role of owners posited by agency theory, but supports the idea that the disciplining effect of product market competition is a powerful substitute for ownership. The evidence also suggests that stockholders may benefit economically from internalizing welfare effects of their actions on other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, and the local community.
Introduction
The distribution of control rights among the firm's stakeholders attracts considerable public attention in many countries. For instance, a common view in the UK and the US is that firms
The first firm type in our sample is pure savings banks (sparebank), which are ownerless foundations controlled by depositors, employees, and the local government.
1 Thus, these are not collectively owned mutuals, but genuinely ownerless enterprises where no stakeholder has cash flow rights. The second type is commercial banks (forretningsbank), which are stock companies owned and controlled by stockholders and listed on the exchange. These two types represent our two extreme types in terms of objectives and stakeholder control. The third type, which we call PCC bank (grunnfondsbank), is a mixture of the two extreme types. A PCC bank has voluntarily transformed itself from a pure savings bank (hereafter non-PCC bank) into a hybrid form by issuing primary capital certificates (hence PCC). These contracts are equity securities held by the general public and are normally listed. Thus, a PCC bank is partly an ownerless, pure savings bank controlled by non-owner stakeholders without cash flow rights, partly a pure stock company controlled by stockholders with cash flow rights.
Given these differences in stakeholder structure, it is not surprising that the objective function varies across organizational form. Commercial banks have profit maximization as their goal, whereas non-PCC banks have multiple goals.
2 PCC banks also have multiple goals, but the objective function is different than in non-PCC banks because PCC banks also have stockholders with cash flow rights and voting rights.
The literature gives some guidance on how our sample firms will behave and perform. First, economic theory shows that profit maximization and stockholder control is Pareto optimal in a competitive equilibrium, provided security markets are perfect and complete, information is symmetric, and agency costs are zero. Second, introducing imperfections into this Arrow-Debreu economy means that theory has considerably less to say about efficient combinations of objectives and governance. Ignoring the issue of Pareto optimality and assuming zero agency costs, Allen et al. (2006) shows theoretically that concern for other objectives than profit maximization will influence the firm's behaviour. For instance, firms with controlling stockholders who start internalizing their employee's private layoff costs will change behaviour in equilibrium by taking on less risk, producing less output, and charging higher prices. Third, extant bank research has shown theoretically and empirically that information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers makes banking relationships valuable for customers beyond the value of a single transaction (Karceski et al. (2005) is a recent example). Thus, terminating a banking relationship and starting a new one is costly, particularly for small firms, which are generally more opaque. Also, growing banks tend to reduce the supply of funds to small firms.
This suggests that in our sample, local authorities protecting the local economy and bank customers protecting their banking relationship will use their control rights to influence the strategy of savings banks in general and of non-PCC banks in particular. Such concerns will materialize as a pressure on management to choose a low risk strategy in order to avoid bank distress, and to go for modest growth that enables local, small businesses to keep their bank relationship. According to Allen et al. (2006) , the tendency for stakeholder-oriented firms to price less aggressively will also produce higher interest margins in savings banks than in commercial banks. Thus, the bank's stakeholder structure will influence the characteristics of the income statement as well as the composition and dynamics of the balance sheet. As for performance, the agency logic suggests that commercial banks will produce higher average returns for a given risk than savings banks. This is because owners have a valuable monitoring role and because concern for non-owner stakeholders in the firm's objective function is costly for the owners.
We conjecture that compared to commercial banks, ownerless savings banks will be (i) less risky, (ii) smaller, charge higher prices, and grow less, and (iii) be less profitable for a given risk. The corresponding characteristics of PCC banks will be somewhere in between the two pure types. Consistent with the first two predictions, we find that compared to ownercontrolled commercial banks, ownerless savings banks (i) have less risky balance sheets and less risky returns to capital invested. Also, they (ii) are smaller and price their products less aggressively. The difference in growth rates is not statistically different from zero.
Inconsistent with prediction (iii) based on agency theory, commercial banks do not outperform ownerless savings banks in economic terms. 3 In fact, commercial banks underperform significantly in certain periods, both in statistical and economic terms. Although this finding does not imply that stockholders produce no value, it does suggest owners are redundant in the sense that other corporate governance mechanisms can do the job at least as efficiently. In particular, successful ownerless firms respond to disciplining mechanisms that substitute for the monitoring function of equity capital providers. This behavior should be considered endogenous responses to exogenous determinants in the firm's environment.
Three exogenous determinants are potentially relevant in our sample. First, the public banking supervisory monitors all banks according to the same rules. However, banking supervisors do not fill the role of monitoring stockholders because supervisors focus on limiting downside risk rather than encouraging maximum value creation. Second, because ownerless bank cannot raise outside equity, non-PCC banks are less able to overinvest than other banks. We find no convincing empirical support for this explanation either. Also, the fact that non-PCCs have no owners can produce just the opposite argument: Because no dividend is paid and hence all earnings retained, non-PCCs are less rather than more disciplined by equity constraints than other banks. Moreover, even if we had found that the inability to raise equity reduces the agency cost of overinvestment, it still remains to explain why multiple-objective firms make at least as profitable investments as firms with profit-maximization as their single goal. Thus, even if non-PCC banks were capital constrained in ways that prevent investment in projects with negative NPV, why would they spend the limited equity on projects with the most positive NPV?
This question brings us to the third exogenous determinant, which is the need to perform when markets are competitive. The logic is simply that regardless of how control rights are distributed, only efficient firms survive in competitive markets (Machlup, 1967; Scharfstein, 1988; Schmidt, 1997) . We provide some evidence that this is the more probable explanation for our finding. That is, firms without owners survive in markets when they respond to competitive pressure in ways they would have done in a market with less competition, but with monitoring owners. Active ownership and strong competition are substitute governance mechanisms.
Finally, the three bank types have coexisted in our sample over extended periods of time. This may suggest there is no universally dominant type and that the value of ownership relative to other ways of organizing enterprise depends on a wider set of stakeholder, firm, and market characteristics than we explore. In fact, the theoretical literature surveyed by Hansmann (1996) shows that ownerless firms may be both sustainable and optimal. Moreover, owned firms may not be owned by their capital providers, but by other stakeholders, such as customers and employees. Such organizational forms are more efficient the stronger the firm's market power over these stakeholders, the more firm-specific their human capital, and the less symmetric the information between the parties.
We conclude that the stakeholder structure drives the firm's behavior in the direction predicted by theory and existing evidence. In contrast, the observed relationship between stakeholder structure and economic performance is inconsistent with agency theory. This suggests there is a serious challenger to the classic organizational form of enterprise, which assigns the control rights to stockholders in profit-maximizing firms. Neither the onedimensional objective of profit-maximization nor the stockholders' monitoring of management seems critical for value creation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and presents our predictions, and the third section describes the data set and the development of the Norwegian banking industry over the sample period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . We analyze the banks' behavior in section 4 and their economic performance in section 5. Summary and conclusions follow in section 6.
Theory
According to the theory of the firm, the distribution of control rights may influence the firm's behavior and performance both through its objective function and its corporate governance system. The objective function channel is evident when multiple stakeholder types are sharing the control rights. For instance, employee directors may be more willing than stockholder directors to sacrifice residual cash flow in order to increase job security. Even when all control rights belong to one stakeholder type, however, such as the stockholders in most corporations, the objective function will depend on how the controlling stakeholder handles externalities faced by other stakeholders. For instance, ethical mutual funds may focus more than other stockholders on whether the firms they own are employing, producing, and pricing in socially acceptable ways.
The firm's governance system is considered particularly important when control rights are delegated to management. The principal-agent paradigm argues that firms will underperform unless they have monitors who actively discipline opportunistic managers in ways that foster economic efficiency. According to this logic, owners matter not only because they finance the firm's investments. Stockholders who delegate control can also monitor management and thereby ensure they make decisions that maximize the value of the capital invested. Hence, monitoring is considered a valuable corporate governance mechanism, and firms with weak stockholder control rights are thought to be disadvantaged compared to firms where stockholders are stronger. Moreover, the agency framework suggests that conflicts of interest between stakeholder types will produce lower returns to capital invested in firms with multiple objectives than if profit maximization is the only goal. Tirole (2001) takes the agency model one step further by keeping the separation between ownership and control, but by allowing for multiple stakeholder types. Thus, the control rights do not only reside with owners and managers, but also with customers, employees, politicians, and society at large. This means the firm's objective function reflects the preferences of several stakeholder types. In such a context, maximizing returns to capital invested may no longer be the dominating concern, and monitoring by owners may be a less critical governance mechanism. Table 1 shows how control (voting) rights and cash flow rights are distributed among the four stakeholder types in our sample firms. The non-PCC bank has a committee of representatives with members appointed by the employees (25% of the votes), depositors (37.5%), and local authorities (37.5%). This committee elects the board, and the two bodies jointly hire and fire the CEO. Since no stakeholder has cash flow rights, this is genuinely an ownerless firm. In contrast, commercial banks have owners who write the corporate charter, elect two thirds of the firm's directors in the stockholder meeting, and have a 100% claim on the residual cash flow. 4 Finally, holders of PCC securities are owners, but have only a fractional claim on the residual cash flow corresponding to their share of the bank's equity, which varies between 5% and 90%. Their voting right is 25% by law, which means they elect 25% of the committee of representatives. In every other respect, PCC securities give the same ownership rights as regular shares. Notice, however, that because the PCC capital is senior to the remaining, ownerless equity, PCC securities are less risky than the equity of an otherwise identical commercial bank. Table 1 All our sample firms operate in the same product market, are exposed to the same regulatory regime, and are monitored by the same public banking inspector (Kredittilsynet) . Because monitoring is assumed to be valuable and because of the assumed tradeoff between the interests of owners and other stakeholders, the agency perspective predicts that economic performance will be lower the weaker the owners' control rights and the more multi-faceted the firm's objective function. Thus, commercial banks will perform best economically, non-PCC banks worst, and PCC banks will fall somewhere in between.
Although Allen et al. (2006) ignore the agency problem, they challenge the idea that owners necessarily lose wealth if they internalize other stakeholders' private disutility caused by the firm's actions, such as search costs for new jobs after a corporate bankruptcy. They show formally that such a stakeholder policy may even increase the value of the firm. The mechanism by which this happens is that multiple-objective firms soften competition by charging higher prices and producing less volume in equilibrium. 5 This positive firm value effect comes more easily if regulation dictates social responsibility for all firms (such as mandating employee directors) or if consumers are willing to pay more for products from socially responsible firms (such as firms that downsize less in recessions).
In our setting, the Allen et al. (2006) model suggests that compared to commercial banks, ownerless non-PCC banks will reduce the externalities of financial distress by taking on less risk, with PCC banks in between. We will see shortly that the banking literature has made the same predictions and found supporting evidence in similar contexts.
6 However, only Allen et al. (2006) predict that the return to capital invested may increase if the firm puts more weight on the preferences of non-owner stakeholders. This difference may be due to the fact that Allen et al. ignore costly separation between ownership and control. In fact, Tirole (2001) argues that the major governance problem for owners of multiple objective firms is not to trade off the interest of multiple stakeholder types ex ante, but to assess decision quality ex post. Managers of multiple-objective firms can always argue that although profits was mediocre compared to profit-maximizing competitors, the score was better on objectives that are expensive to fulfill and hard to evaluate, such as social responsibility. We try to shed light on the seriousness of ignoring this monitoring problem by testing the predictive power rather than the descriptive accuracy of the agency model versus the Allen et al. (2006) model.
The banking literature offers several insights into how behavior will differ across our bank types in terms of observable characteristics like growth, size, and risk taking. Banking relationships are valuable for the bank's customers and particularly for small start-up firms with limited access to alternative sources of debt financing. This has been shown both theoretically (Campbell, 1979; Fama, 1985; Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992; Boot and Thakor, 1994; von Thadden, 1995; Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995; Yosha, 1995) and empirically (Slovin et al, 1993; Hubbard et al., 1999; Ongena et al., 2003) . Morerover, Karceski et al. (2005) document that customers may be adversely affected not only when a bank is insolvent, but also when it merges or is taken over. Berger and Udell (1996) and Peek and Rosengren (1996) show that as banks grow through consolidation, they tend to reduce the supply of loans to small businesses. 7 Finally, Stein (2002) provides a theoretical explanation for a size effect in lending, where large banks lend to large firms and small banks lend to small firms in equilibrium.
Overall, the banking literature suggests that certain customers will benefit from dealing with large banks, whereas others will suffer when their bank is big, grows fast, merges, or faces financial distress. 8 Moreover, a bank's assets and liabilities are unusually liquid because they can be shifted substantially over a short time period at low adjustment costs. Thus, Esty (1997a) argues that differences in stakeholder structure will make balance sheets differ both across bank types and also within the same bank over time. Esty (1997b) documents that when his sample of depositor-owned S&Ls in the US convert to stockholder-owned commercial banks, their asset and liability structures change considerably. In particular, banks grow faster and take on more risk after having transformed to a stockholder-owned type.
Summarizing, we conjecture that compared to commercial banks, ownerless savings banks have less risk, are smaller, and grow more slowly. PCC banks are somewhere in between the two pure types. In an agency setting, risk-adjusted returns to capital invested will be lowest in ownerless banks, highest in commercial banks, with PCC banks in between. If the corporate governance problem is better handled by firms with multiple objectives and by other disciplining mechanisms than monitoring stockholders, performance is no longer positively related to the fraction of control rights and cash flow rights held by stockholders. 7 However, Strahan and Weston (1998) and Berger et al. (1998) show that the supply of funds for small businesses may not decrease after a bank merger, provided competing, smaller banks are ready to fill the gap. 8 These arguments are also plausible reason why three different organizational forms coexist in our sample According to the classic view, coexistence is infeasible, as the superior organisational form will crowd out the others. In some industries, however, the customer value of the product depends on the survival of the supplier after the purchase. This value is particularly relevant in the financial industry, where switching costs will make some customers benefit more than others from a bank with smaller default risk, lower chance of being taken over, smaller size, and slower growth. These characteristics correspond to those of ownerless savings banks as opposed to commercial banks in our sample. However, the control right in savings banks is illiquid, since it is tied to the customer status. Customers must be compensated for this illiquidity, and Remmers (2003) hypothesizes that the cost of capital will be higher in savings banks than commercial banks. On the other hand, a commercial bank is problematic for the customer because its owners have post-contract incentives to increase the risk at their customers' expense. In order to induce customers to still purchase their product, owners in the Remmers model contract with the manager to limit the bank's risk taking. Hence, unlike savings banks, commercial banks incur contracting costs between owners and managers. For the same reason, commercial banks must offer lower prices. Thus, Remmers predicts that coexistence may exist in equilibrium. Compared to owner-controlled banks, banks with weaker owner control will have lower contracting costs, higher costs of capital, and charge higher prices.
Industry characteristics
The first Norwegian savings bank was established in 1822, followed by the first commercial bank in 1848. Regulation introduced in 1985 opened up for PCC banks, and the first such bank was founded in 1988 when a pure savings bank (non-PCC bank) chose to become a PCC bank.
Our data set includes every Norwegian savings bank (non-PCC and PCC) and all listed Norwegian commercial banks from 1985 to 2002. There are 2668 firm years altogether, of which non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and commercial banks account for 2288, 214, and 166, respectively. As shown by panel (a) in table 2, the total number of banks of all types except PCCs decline monotonically over time. For instance, the number of non-PCC banks and commercial banks drops from 191 to 103 and from 15 to 2, respectively. The opposite pattern is evident for PCC banks, as the number increases from 3 in 1988 to 24 in 2002. From 1994 on, there are more PCC banks than commercial banks.
Besides Norway, the only European countries where savings banks have a prevalent position are Germany (Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004) and Spain (Crespi et al., 2004) , accounting for roughly half of total bank assets. However, German savings banks are owned by local governments, only Norway and Spain have ownerless savings banks (non-PCC banks), and only Norway has PCC banks. Table 2 Norwegian banks went through a systemic crisis in the period 1988-1992 (see Moe et al. (2004) for a review). The first bank failure occurred in the fall of 1988, and 13 small and medium sized banks failed in 1988-1990. 9 By the end of 1990 large commercial banks were in trouble as well. The government established a bank insurance fund to finance distressed banks. To qualify for government support, strict criteria had to be met which sometimes involved a write-off of the existing share capital. This policy brought the three largest Norwegian commercial banks under full state ownership in 1992. The banking industry regained profitability in 1993, and the state gradually reduced its ownership. By the end of our sample period, the state held a minority stake (47.8%) in the largest commercial bank and had sold all their shares in the two others.
Panel (b) of table 2 shows total bank assets across bank types. The figures are averaged over the sample period and expressed in billion NOK as of 2002. Although the commercial bank sector is largest in the beginning of the sample period (58%) and the savings bank sector is largest in the end (61%), the overall market share of the two sectors in terms of total assets is fairly equal. There is a strong tendency within the savings bank sector for the non-PCCs to lose market share to the PCCs. Assets in PCCs were just half the assets in non-PCCs in 1988, but almost three times higher in 2002.
Descriptive statistics for the size per bank appear in panel (c). All distributions are skewed to the right, reflecting that each type has a few banks that are unusually large. Focusing on median size, the table shows that on average, a commercial bank is roughly five times larger than a PCC bank, which in turn is twelve times the size of a pure savings bank. The average annual growth is 12,2% for commercial banks, 12.1% for PCC banks and 10.3% for non-PCC banks. These averages do not differ from each other in a statistically significant way. Allen et al. (2006) predict that stakeholder firms will compete more softly than stockholder firms. Panel (a) of table 3 shows that interest rates offered on deposits by the banks in our sample do not differ noticeably between bank types. However, panel (b) documents that lending rates on home building loans, which is the largest asset in all bank types, are higher in savings banks. Thus, the interest rate margin (lending rate minus savings rate) is higher in stakeholder-oriented firms, which is consistent with the Allen et al. prediction. Table 3 Allen et al. (2006) also hypothesize that as some firms switch from a stakeholder structure towards more concern for stockholders, competition will be tougher, and prices will fall. Panel (b) suggests that this may have happened in our sample as non-PCC banks became PCC banks. The average interest rate margin is steadily decreasing over the period, independently of the general level of interest rates. However, there are several competing explanations, like technology improvement, better price transparency, and increased competition from foreign and domestic entrants.
10 Unfortunately, we do not have pricing data at the individual bank level to investigate the pricing issue more formally.
To summarize this section, the Norwegian banking industry consists of commercial banks and savings banks, and a savings bank is either a PCC bank or a non-PCC bank. The relative size of the commercial bank and the savings bank sectors stays roughly equal over the sample period 1985-2002. On average, the median commercial bank is five times the size of a PCC bank, which is turn is twelve times larger than a non-PCC bank. The concentration of the banking industry increases over time, and the decreasing number of non-PCC banks is partially driven by non-PCCs transforming themselves into PCCs. The first PCC bank was established in 1988, the number grows steadily to 24 in 2002, and the aggregate size of PCC banks exceeds that of non-PCC banks from 1991 on. Asset growth per bank is not significantly different across the three bank types. Although we lack sufficiently detailed data for formal tests, we find supporting evidence of the Allen et al. (2006) prediction that stakeholder-oriented firms charge higher prices, and that closer attention to multiple stakeholders softens competition.
Stakeholder structure and balance sheet characteristics
Based on the idea that the distribution of control rights drives the firm's decisions and the fact that a bank's assets and liabilities have low adjustment costs, this section explores the relationship between bank type and balance sheet composition. We start with descriptive statistics showing how balance sheets differ across the three bank types. These relationships are subsequently tested formally by means of a logit model.
Assets
Panel (a) of table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the asset structure across bank types. We divide the assets into the seven categories of fixed assets, down-payment contracts, short-term assets, overdraft facilities, building loans, other loans, and losses.
11 Using a bank's total assets as weights, all averages are value-weighted across firms per year and equally weighted across years.
The interest earned is lower on downpayment contracts than on overdraft facilities and building loans. This difference reflects riskiness and handling costs. Consumers mainly 10 Internet banking was introduced towards the end of the sample period with the first pure internet bank opening in 2000. Comparative surveys of lending and deposit rates appeared in the media early in the sample period, and foreign banks started entering the Norwegian market around the same time. 11 Short-term assets include cash, loans to the central bank, loans to other financial institutions, short-term bonds, and equity holdings below 20% in other companies. Down-payment contracts are loans where the principal is gradually paid back, such as mortgages. Other loans are all loans not fitting into any other category, such as factoring, leasing, and credit cards. Fixed assets is real estate, long-term bonds and shares representing at least 20% ownership. Losses is the actual loss in the period plus increased allowances made for expected future losses. demand mortgages for their downpayment contracts, which reduces the risk and the interest rate. Business loans are generally more risky and pay a higher average return. A bank wanting to increase the expected return may shift some assets away from downpayment contracts to more risky instruments. This will produce a higher interest rate margin and higher asset risk.
Thus, risk will generally increase from left to right in the table. Given the stakeholder structure, we expect to find the highest fraction of downpayment contracts in non-PCCs, while PCCs and commercials have more of its assets in the more risky asset classes towards the right in the table. Table 4 The table shows that downpayment contracts constitute the largest component of the assets for all bank types. Consistent with our stakeholder-driven risk argument, the average fraction of downpayments is higher in savings banks (about 75%) than commercial banks (49%). Short-term assets are the second largest asset component for every bank type. As an average over time, investments in short-term assets are slightly more common in commercial banks (21% vs. 17%). Although the pooled average for losses is practically the same fraction of total assets in all three types (roughly 2%), the time pattern differs considerably (not shown in the table). The fraction decreases slowly from about 2.4% at the end of the banking crisis to 1.7% four years later in non-PCC banks. In contrast, the losses are typically two to three times higher in commercial banks and PCCs in the final crisis year and are also larger every year over the next four years. Thus, pure savings banks that survived the crisis were less adversely affected by losses after the crisis than the survivors among the two other types.
We have tested the statistical significance of the altogether 462 annual differences between pairs of average asset ratios across the three bank types over the 18 years. Choosing a 5% level and a one-sided test, we find that compared to commercial banks, non-PCC banks have significantly more down-payment contracts, less short-term assets, and less unsecured loans in every year. Except for unsecured loans, the differences are generally less significant when comparing commercial banks to PCC banks. The difference between non-PCC banks and PCC banks is relatively seldom statistically different from zero across all years and asset components.
Liabilities
Just like the assets, liabilities matter for behavior and performance because they can be used to manage risk and return. For instance, banks relying on short term money market funding will face higher risks and higher expected returns than banks with a high fraction of core deposits. Also, the liability structure is important for survival under adverse market conditions, such as in the 1988-1992 crisis years in our sample. This concern for financial distress is compounded by the fact that banks have much higher financial leverage than firms in other industries. Thus, differences in liability structure across bank types may reflect the uniqueness of their organizational form.
We classify liabilities into the five categories of equity, subordinated debt, due to customers, due to banks, and other liabilities.
12 Risk is higher the more the bank is financed with debt, and the more risky the components of the debt. Deposits from customers is regarded the safest form of debt financing. This liability is insured by a fund collectively financed by the banks, and the government acts as a lender of last resort. Therefore, there is no deposit risk for customers if the bank faces financial distress. Due to banks and Other liabilities represent market funding. These liabilities are sensitive to interest rate movements and may also be more costly to roll over under adverse conditions. Thus, banks relying more on market funding are generally more risky. In terms of panel (b) in table 4, this implies risk increases from left to right. We expect non-PCCs to use more equity and deposits from customers, whereas commercial banks will use more market-based debt financing.
Consistent with the idea that non-PCC banks take less risk than other banks, the table shows that they have more equity than others.
13 Also, the composition of the debt financing differs substantially across the three organizational types in the predicted manner. Compared to commercial banks, pure savings banks rely more on deposits (75% vs. 47%), use less subordinated debt (0.3% vs. 3.2%), borrow less in the interbank market (9.5 % vs. 18.9%), and finance less from other debt sources (6.6% vs. 25.8%). Thus, non-PCC banks finance their assets more by deposits and less by market borrowing than commercial banks. PCC banks are roughly midway between the two.
14 With a 5% level and a one-sided test, we find that per year and per financing component, the difference in means between non-PCC banks and commercial banks (PCC) is significantly different from zero in 83% (89%) of the cases. PCC banks differ significantly from commercial banks in one third of the cases.
To check for differences in balance sheet structure more systematically and also to account for multivariate relationships ignored by univariate tests, we estimate a logit model predicting bank type from the bank's size, growth, and balance sheet structure in any given year. We report our findings separately for the whole sample period (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , the crisis years (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) , and the post-crisis period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . The results reported in table 5 generally support the patterns in the descriptive statistics from table 4. For instance, over the period as a whole and during the crisis year, the probability that a randomly selected bank is a commercial bank rather than a non-PCC is significantly higher the larger the bank and the more risky its liabilities. Growth differences have no predictive power except for PCC banks vs. non-PCCs after the crisis. Table 5 The basic idea in this section is that differences in stakeholder structure produce differences in behavior. In particular, the stronger the potential conflict of interest between powerful owners and other stakeholders (employees and customers), the riskier, larger, and more fast-growing the bank. However, stakeholder differences across banks may not be the only reason why their balance sheets differ. Because commercial banks are much larger than savings banks, they may be tempted to take on excessive risk, driven by a feeling of being too big to fail. This is a moral hazard problem triggered by the regulator's desire to prevent contagion. Furthermore, the risk of non-PCCs may be low because they cannot raise new equity. Thus, unlike other bank types, pure savings banks may feel forced to maintain a higher equity financing buffer and hence lower liability risk to protect themselves from adverse 13 Equity for all bank types starts increasing after the end of the banking crisis, when the equity was around 7% for non-PCCs and 3% for the other two. Thus, all bank types become permanently less leveraged after the crisis, but non-PCC banks increase their relative equity financing the most. Norwegian banking regulation imposes a minimum capital requirement, as total liable capital must be at least 8% of total risk weighted assets. Depending on the bank's balance sheet structure, total risk-weighted assets may differ considerably from total assets. 14 The funding through financial institutions drops considerably over time for every bank type, the importance of other liabilities increases, and the use of subordinated debt stays fairly constant. Subordinated debt seems to have been important for PCC banks and commercial banks in the last part of the crisis and some years thereafter. Savings banks rely increasingly less on deposits, whereas their importance for commercial banks stays fairly constant. However, the fraction of assets financed by deposits gradually approach each other in PCC banks and commercial banks. In the final year, they are 53.4% and 49.7%, respectively. This pattern suggests that just like commercial banks, which they resemble more and more over time in terms of debt structure, PCC banks are more dependent on the capital market than non-PCC banks. This financing strategy makes PCC banks more sensitive to adverse credit market conditions than the non-PCC type they have converted from. effects of market downturns. These additional explanations, which have not been accounted for in this section, may bias our results towards finding larger risk differences between bank types than what is justified by their stakeholder structures alone. Although we are unable to address the potential moral hazard problem, our robustness tests in section 5.4 will show that the inability to raise new equity in non-PCCs is not a binding constraint on their behavior.
Summarizing, we have documented a systematic relationship between stakeholder structure and balance sheet composition across the three organizational forms. Non-PCC banks carry less risk on both sides of their balance sheet than commercial banks. This is consistent with stakeholder-driven firm behavior as found for depositor-owned S&Ls vs. stockholderowned commercial banks in the US (Esty, 1997a) . Local governments and depositors, who hold a controlling stake in non-PCC banks, make sure the bank is run safely and provides loans to the local industry. In contrast, stockholders control commercial banks and want it to maximize shareholder value by choosing assets and liabilities with higher risk. Finally, because the control rights in PCC banks belong to stakeholder types found both in pure savings banks (employees, customers, and politically appointed directors) and in pure commercial banks (employees and shareholders), our finding that PCC banks end up in between the two pure types on most balance sheet characteristics is as expected from the theory.
We expect that these differences in risk across organizational forms will reappear in terms of systematic performance differences across changing market conditions. In particular, the lower risk of ownerless firms will make their returns to capital invested move less with overall market movements than owned firms. Thus, we expect that compared to commercial banks, the performance of pure savings banks is stronger the weaker the overall banking market. The next section supports this intuition.
Stakeholders and performance
Section 4 showed that the firm's behavior relates systematically to its stakeholder structure. However, the critical governance question from an economic point of view is not if the stakeholder structure matters for behavior per se, but whether it matters for economic performance.
Because non-PCC banks are not listed, we cannot measure performance by market returns. Instead, our basic performance measure is book return on assets (ROA), which we define as net income per unit book value of total assets. Although return on equity (net income per unit book value of equity) is a more direct performance measure from the stockholders' perspective, it is unsuitable in our context because its denominator is periodically very low and even negative in the crisis years, producing very volatile and sometimes meaningless figures. For instance, average return on equity in commercial banks is -152% in 1991 and 18% in 1997. One commercial bank had equity of -11,5 bill. NOK in 1989.
Why do we measure return on assets after funding costs rather than before? This is because funding costs are typically 75% of the bank's total costs, making funding costs the dominating cost component by wide margins. Thus, not deducting funding costs means ignoring the major driver of a bank's competitive cost advantage. For the same reason, earnings before funding costs, which is completely dominated by interest income, is very sensitive to the level of interest rates. Thus, gross ROA (return on assets before funding costs) will move in tandem with the level of interest rates, regardless of the bank's ability to create returns on capital invested. This distortion is absent in our ROA measure, which is also used in the existing studies that comes closest to ours (Esty, 1997a; Crespi et al, 2004) .
We will still analyze several alternative performance measures in section 5.3, including return on equity and gross ROA. Notice also that because our ROA relates net income after funding costs to total assets, it will produce lower return figures than gross ROA. This means we cannot meaningfully compare our ROA figures to standard benchmarks such as the riskless rate or the market risk premium.
Descriptive statistics
Panel (a) of table 6 shows the sample firms' average ROA across bank types and years. On average over the years, pure savings banks have the highest return on assets, being 0.88% in non-PCC banks, 0.41% in PCCs, and 0.32% in commercial banks. Non-PCCs outperform commercial banks in 15 of the 18 sample years, and PCC banks are closer to commercial banks than to non-PCCs. However, the t-values in panel (b) show that the statistical significance of the performance differences is considerably weaker after the banking crisis than before and during the crisis. Table 6 Panel (c) shows average volatility of ROA across the three bank types, measuring a bank's ROA volatility in year t as the standard deviation of ROA over the period t-1 to t+1. Like we found using risk measures from the balance sheet in section 4, risk is highest in commercial banks (0.68%), lowest in non-PCCs (0.45%), and PCCs are in between (0.58%). As expected, volatility is higher for all bank types around the banking crisis. Moreover, the relative riskiness of non-PCCs increases considerably during the last sample years. However, the fact that the limited time period forces us to use only three data points to measure ROA volatility suggests we should not put too much weight on these patterns relative to those based on the balance sheet structure Tables 6 shows that the performance of commercial banks was most negatively hit by the banking crisis. As discussed in section 4, this is implied by our finding that they pursue more risky investment and financing strategies. That is, the fact that commercial banks have more risky balance sheets will necessarily make them more vulnerable to downturns in the market. What is more surprising is that they do not appear to be doing correspondingly better after the crisis. We next analyze this issue.
Statistical tests for the base case
Since our data set is a panel, using OLS on the pooled sample produces biased and inefficient estimates (Hsiao, 2003) . We avoid this problem by using a random effects model to account for firm level effects and year dummies to capture annual fixed effects for the banking industry as a whole. To account for fixed industry effects that differ across bank types, we estimate the model for the whole sample period, for the banking crisis years, and for the post-crisis period. The robustness tests in section 5.3 explore what happens when we ignore random effects at the firm level or ignore the panel structure altogether by using pooled OLS.
Our base case is estimated in table 7. PCC and Com are dummy variables that equal one if the bank is of the said type and zero otherwise. Thus, both are zero for a non-PCC bank. We proxy for asset risk and liability risk by the ratio 1-((cash+loans+fixed assets)/total assets) and the ratio 1-(due to customers/total assets), respectively. Firm size is measured as the log of total assets.
The agency model predicts that the two dummy variables will have positive coefficients, and the coefficient for the commercial bank will be the more positive of the two. In contrast, Allen et al. (2006) posit that although the value of the firm may increase if it internalizes welfare externalities on non-owner stakeholders, one cannot in general rank the coefficients a priori. The specific situation (such as the customers' willingness to pay higher prices for products from stakeholder-oriented banks) will determine whether savings banks will have higher or lower risk-adjusted returns to capital invested than commercial banks.
Although we deal with accounting returns on operations rather than market returns on traded securities, we still expect that unless the banking industry is grossly out of equilibrium over extended periods, there will be a positive relationship between risk and return. Moreover, economies (diseconomies) of scale in banking will produce a positive (negative) coefficient for the size variable. Since the evidence on scale economies in banking is ambiguous (Berger and Humphrey, 1994; Hughes et al, 2001 ), we do not predict the sign for the size coefficient. Also, since what matters for this argument is size per se rather than how this has been attained, we do not distinguish between size attained by organic growth and by M&As. Table 7 According to the first column of results in table 7, which shows the estimates for the full period, this model explains 31% of the variation in a bank's ROA, and the regression is highly significant. Non-PCC savings banks, which we know from table 6 have an average ROA of 0.88%, outperform PCC savings banks by 0.18 ROA percentage units per year and commercial banks by 0.77 after having controlled for differences in risk and size. The riskiness of the assets and the liabilities are both positively related to returns, and there are diseconomies of scale.
15 All these findings are statistically significant by a wide margin. The second column estimates the basic model over the crisis years 1988-1992. Every sign from the full sample period is maintained, and both the economic and statistical significance increase considerably except for asset risk. For instance, the expected excess ROA of a pure savings bank is now 1.5 percentage units relative to a PCC and 2.7 compared to a commercial bank. Thus, what holds for the full sample period is even more pronounced in the crisis years. As noticed in section 4, the fact that ownerless banks are less risky makes us expect that they will do better that others in a systemic crisis.
These findings from for 1988-1992 suggest the pattern for the full period in the left column may be driven by the exceptional crisis years in the middle column. The right column confirms that impression. Although the coefficients of the two dummy variables keep their negative sign, they are much smaller, being down by almost 50% for PCCs and by over 80% for commercial banks. Moreover, the coefficient of the commercial bank dummy is not significantly different from zero, and the coefficient of the PCC dummy is only significant at the 9% level. Thus, as indicated by the univariate statistics in section 5.1, there is no clear performance difference between the three bank types after the crisis. 16 It may be argued, however, that the full period is more relevant than any of the two subperiods when evaluating the performance of alternative organizational forms. An organization that exists both in normal and non-normal periods must have an ability to handle both. Anyway, we can at least conclude so far that the surprising result in an agency perspective is that owned firms do not outperform ownerless firms in normal times either.
That being said, however, one may wonder what remains of the classic arguments for ownerless banks. Unlike in earlier periods, it does not seem true anymore that their customers (lenders and borrowers) would face excessive contracting costs in commercial banks, that they have particularly homogenous preferences as a group, that they would lack regulatory protection against moral hazard by commercial bank owners, or that ownerless banks are so small that agency costs are negligible. Nevertheless, our findings are inconsistent with the argument that because ownerless firms retain all their earnings and are immune to the market for corporate control, they represent the only firm type in our sample that can survive long after having lost their competitive advantage as an organizational form (Hansmann, 1996, p. 262) . If this were a valid explanation, the ownerless savings banks in our sample would have had weaker performance than other banks. If anything, we find the opposite.
Robustness
We analyse the robustness of our findings for the base-case by (i) comparing the results under different methods for handling the panel structure, (ii) using sized-matched samples, (iii) proxying for risk by ROA volatility, and (iv) measuring performance in alternative ways. Table 8 documents that the econometric approach to the panel structure influences the estimates. In each of the three panels, model (a) is the base-case model from table 7. Model (b) disregards random effects at the firm level and only considers fixed year effects for the industry, whereas (c) ignores both. Thus, if we neither account for the panel data structure and instead just run OLS on the pooled sample like in model (c), the adjusted R 2 drops by almost 90% for the full period and by roughly two thirds in the two subperiods compared to models (a) and (b). Still, the estimated sign and the statistical significance of the coefficients in (c) are not strikingly different from those in models (a) and (b), suggesting that the pooled OLS is not grossly biased and inefficient. The second point to notice from models (a) and (b) is that what matters for overall model fit is the time effects and not the firm effects. Thus, the fixed effect ruining the OLS estimates stems from time-varying characteristics of the banking industry as a whole rather than firm-specific effects ignored by our firm-specific measures of risk and size. Table 8 The base-case results may be influenced by the fact most non-PCCs are small compared to PCCs and commercial banks. For instance, table 2 shows that the median commercial bank is sixty times larger than the median non-PCC bank. Although our base-case model does control for size, the fact that size is so consistently different across bank types may create a sample heterogeneity that is not properly picked up by our control variable. For instance, the technology used by small banks may deviate so much from the technology of large banks that size alone does not capture this difference. To test for the seriousness of size heterogeneity, we construct a matching sample where size is much more homogeneous across bank types. The matched sample only contains non-PCC banks that are larger than the smallest commercial bank, and we keep at least as many non-PCC banks as commercial banks in the sample. These restrictions reduce sample size by roughly 80% compared to the base-case.
Panel (a) of table 9 shows that when we re-estimate the base-case model in the matched sample, the main results persist. As expected, the coefficients for the PCC and commercial bank dummies have weaker statistical significance due to much smaller samples. Table 9 In panel (b), we re-estimate the base-case model by measuring risk as ROA volatility from table 6 rather than by proxies based on the composition of assets and liabilities. The relationship between bank type and ROA from table 6 is generally upheld, but the economic and statistical significance drops. Also, PCCs and non-PCCs are closer than earlier. The relationship between risk and return becomes negative and is stronger in the full period than in the two sub-periods. We suspect this strange relationship reflects two fundamental data problems in the volatility measure. First, and as we noted in section 5.1, a given value of this proxy is only based on three observations, reflecting the fact that we only have annual data and a limited time series. Second, the structural relationship between risk and return is unstable over the sample period. This is because volatility is very high and performance is very low during the crisis years. Thus, we prefer the risk measures based on the balance sheet to the one based on ROA volatility.
The fourth robustness test replaces the ROA performance measure used so far by either the gross ROA (which is ROA before funding costs), the ROE (return on equity), the profit margin (net income over revenues), or the interest rate margin (net interest income over assets). Table 10 shows the findings, which are more consistent with those under ROA from table 7 when we measure performance by either gross ROA, ROE or the profit margin than by the interest rate margin. For instance, ROA, gross ROA, ROE, and the profit margin all produce a negative and significant coefficient for the PCC and Commercial dummies in the full period and in the crisis period. They also have a positive, significant sign for asset risk in ten out of twelve cases. The only noticeable difference is that unlike the ROA, ROE, and the profit margin, the gross ROA indicates that commercial banks do significantly better than the two other bank types after the crisis. Table 10 For reasons discussed earlier, we are not the first to consider ROA the more suitable performance measure for banks. Still, it is reassuring that the major conclusions about relative performance are quite insensitive to how performance is measured.
So far, we have ignored the potential endogeneity problem caused by the fact that poorly performing non-PCC banks may have converted to PCCs to be able to raise new equity. Ignoring this possibility may bias our results towards overestimating the relative performance of non-PCCs. We explore this possibility by testing the base-case model under two alternative samples. First, we pool all savings banks (i.e., non-PCCs and PCCs) into one joint group. Second, we exclude all PCCs from the sample and also non-PCCs that later convert to PCC status. The results, which are no reported, produce no material changes to the base-case results in table 7 in terms of differences between commercial banks and non-PCC banks
Two alternative explanations
The surprising finding so far is the lacking support for the agency idea that economic performance improves as the owners' control rights become stronger. We will analyze two reasons why, neither of which necessarily refutes the agency logic. First, if the owners are forced to be passive for exogenous reasons, the key governance mechanism in agency theory will be more or less blocked, and owned firms may not differ from ownerless firms in a governance and performance sense. Second, if firms are disciplined by other governance mechanisms than ownership, monitoring by owners may be redundant.
Restrictions on ownership
Corporate governance research has found that performance tends to improve when ownership rights are held directly (personally) rather than indirectly and when some owners have sufficiently strong incentives and power to monitor the management team (Becht et al, 2002) . These two ownership characteristics deal with owner types and owner concentration, respectively. Table 11 shows the aggregate equity fraction per owner type in panel (a) and the fraction held by the largest and the five largest owners in panel (b). Table 11 According to panel (a), average direct ownership is roughly 50% in PCC banks and 20% in commercial banks. The corresponding figure in other Norwegian listed firms is 18% over a similar period (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006) . This high incidence of direct equity holdings suggests that from an agency perspective, ownership has high value in banking. Therefore, being ownerless may be more of a problem in the banking industry than elsewhere.
Agency theory could make the opposite argument from the ownership concentration figures in panel (b), which are low by European standards and considerably below the typical level in other Norwegian industries, which is roughly a mean holding of 30% for the largest owner and 55% for the five largest (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2006) . This low concentration is due to regulation, which mandates special permission from the Ministry of finance to hold more than 10% of a bank's equity. The table shows that 10% is indeed the median largest holding in a commercial bank over the years, reflecting a binding restriction for the typical bank in our sample. The mean exceeds this median because the state held very large stakes in a few banks around the banking crisis and still held one third of the equity in the largest commercial bank at the end of the sample period.
Because the upper bound on the largest holding is binding in the typical commercial bank, it follows that ownership concentration is suboptimally low. Nevertheless, 10% is about five times higher than the average largest holding in US firms, and 10% of the average commercial bank's equity is no trivial amount in terms of implied monitoring incentives. For instance, 10% of equity in the largest and smallest commercial bank in 2002 is NOK 2.5 bill. and 0.2 bill., respectively. Moreover, there are no regulatory restrictions on large owners' ability to create voting coalitions. Thus, we conclude that although regulation forces ownership concentration below its optimal level, this does not prevent owners from active monitoring.
The potential for such activity may be suboptimal, but far from non-existent.
Substitutes for ownership
Ownership is redundant if other governance mechanisms can do the job at comparable costs. We consider three such substitutes for ownership functions: (i) capital constraints in ownerless firms, (ii) regulators in all firms, and (iii) competition in all firms.
The capital constraint argument is based on the fact that unlike commercial banks and PCC banks, non-PCC banks cannot raise outside equity. Any equity-financed growth must come from past earnings. This apparent handicap may turn out to be a competitive advantage for ownerless banks, provided bank managers tend to overinvest in general and that owner monitoring is weak in owned banks. In such a setting, self-serving managers in owned banks can equity-finance overinvestment with both earnings and equity issues, whereas managers of ownerless banks can only use earnings. Therefore, the lacking outside equity option may discipline managers of ownerless banks in similar ways that active owners would. If this mechanism works, we would expect expansive non-PCC banks to finance their growth more heavily with debt than other banks would, particularly when the banking industry is growing fast. Thus, non-PCCs would be closer than other banks to the minimum equity restriction set by regulators.
The start of our sample period coincides with the beginning of a deregulation period for the banking industry. All banks were given more flexibility and better growth opportunities, including the possibility to compete on interest rates. Given the arguments just made, we would expect non-PCC banks to be more capital constrained than other banks under such market conditions. The capitalization ratios in table 12 do not support this hypothesis. The average ratio is 9.8% in non-PCCs and 7.1% in commercial banks, the non-PCC ratio is statistically larger in 15 of the 18 years, and the maximum ratio in any year is normally more than twice as large in non-PCCs. 17 Thus, because ownerless banks were further away from minimum equity requirements than owned banks, we cannot argue that the inability to raise new equity disciplines ownerless banks in ways that substitute well for owner monitoring.
Table 12
Notice also that although the free cash flow of a non-PCC bank is automatically kept relatively low because the bank cannot raise equity, the opposite effect comes from the fact that it retains all its earnings. This happens because no stakeholder has cash flow rights. Hence, the non-PCC bank is neither disciplined by dividend payments nor by capital market scrutiny in equity flotations. Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividend payout and the resulting need to raise new equity for new investments are powerful corporate governance mechanisms.
What about the public banking supervisor? This monitoring activity occurs according to the same, detailed rules in every bank regardless of its organizational form. Therefore, it may be argued that high-quality banking supervision makes owners redundant. However, the banking supervisor's job is not to maximize the value of the bank, but to limit its downside risk. 18 The existence of a public supervisor may explain why depositors dare to leave their money with a bank whose owners benefit from risk-taking. It may also explain why most banks stay out of bankruptcy. But it cannot explain why a given bank or a given bank type is more profitable than others. This argument is consistent with a study of 244 banks in 44 countries, which finds no convincing relationship between the value of a bank and the way banks are controlled by public authorities (Caprio et al, 2003) . Just like we concluded for regulatory ownership restrictions in all banks and the nonavailability of outside equity for ownerless banks, we think the banking supervisor cannot explain why ownerless banks do so well.
Competition is our third explanation of why ownerless firms are not outperformed by owned firms. The general idea is that more competition reduces admissible inefficiency in any enterprise, regardless of its organizational form. Stronger competition moves product prices closer to marginal production costs in the most efficient firm, making it harder for any firm to survive. Conversely, monopoly power enables inefficient firms to remain in the market.
The theory of agency costs and competition shows that unlike what was originally thought (Leibenstein, 1966; Machlup, 1967; , more competition does not necessarily imply increased effort by value-maximizing firms (Scharfstein, 1988; Schmidt, 1997) . Schmidt (1997) shows that agents with firm-specific human capital always have stronger incentives to work harder the stronger the competition. This happens because more competition reduces profits, thereby increasing the liquidation risk and reducing the value of the agent's firm-specific investment. However, because more competition produces lower product prices and thereby erodes the value of cost-reducing effort, it may be optimal for the principal to induce less effort by the agent. The net effect of these two forces is ambiguous, and the empirical IO literature tends to find an inverted U-shaped relationship between increased competition and innovation. The strongest effect of competition on innovative activity occurs in oligopolistic markets, such as computers and automobiles.
This logic means that if competition disciplines the firm, owner monitoring and competition may be thought of as substitute governance mechanisms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Therefore, monitoring by strong, incentivized owners will only matter for performance when competition is low. This implies that the relationship between organizational form and performance is weaker the stronger the competition. This idea has received some support by the very limited existing evidence on this issue (Palmer, 1973; Masulis et al, 2005) .
We are not saying that governance quality is unimportant in competitive markets. Rather, we say the opposite. When competition is low, it takes active owners to ensure the firm has a value-maximizing governance system, such as competent boards and well-functioning incentive contracts with management. However, the firm may survive even if such owner qualities are missing. In contrast, firms facing strong competition go bankrupt unless they have installed value-maximizing governance systems. If they have weak or even no owners, the competitive pressure and the agents' incentives to survive jointly create the urge to establish value-maximizing governance systems. So, governance (including ownership structure) and performance are unrelated when competition is strong because all firms have optimal governance installed. In contrast, governance and performance are systematically related when competition is weak because not every firm needs optimal governance to survive (Demsetz, 1983) .
Competitive pressure may come from the firm's product market, labor market, and the market for corporate control. The latter market cannot explain our finding, as the most efficient organizational type (non-PCC banks) cannot be traded. We doubt that labor market competition does the job, since unemployment was only 4.2% on average and never exceeded 6.0% in the sample period.
19 However, since the local demand for management in financial institutions in smaller locations may be thin, managers of savings banks in particular may be disciplined by potential loss of firm-specific human capital if the bank is underperforming.
This leaves us with product market competition as the premier candidate for rationalizing our results.. To substantiate this explanation, notice first that all banks in our sample have access to the same product market, and that there are no major economic or regulatory barriers to entry. Second, product market competition in Norwegian banks seems relatively strong internationally. Table 13 shows market concentration in banking across 16 European countries from 1990 to 2002. We measure market concentration as total assets in the five largest banks divided by total assets in all banks. Table 13 The table documents large variations in competitive pressure across countries. For instance, concentration is very high in Finland and the Netherlands, where the five largest banks control 80% of the banking assets. At the opposite extreme of low concentration, Italy has 25% and Germany has 18%. Market concentration in Norwegian banks is medium in a European context and consistently lower than in other Scandinavian countries. Moreover, whereas average concentration across all countries has stayed quite constant over time, concentration in Norwegian banking drops in the early part of the period and stays close to the average European level thereafter.
Summary and conclusions
Economists tend to take for granted that when ownership is separated from control, monitoring by those who own the capital invested will change the firm's behavior and improve its performance. Similarly, we seldom question the conventional wisdom that stockholders will lose wealth if they internalize welfare effects of their actions on other stakeholders, such as employees and customers. This paper challenges these two ideas by analyzing empirically how firms with widely different stakeholder structures choose their assets and liabilities and how they perform economically under different market conditions. In particular, we explore whether ownership is critical for governance by comparing ownerless banks with multiple objectives to profit-maximizing firms owned by stockholders.
Our results show that firm behavior differs across organizational forms in ways predicted by a stakeholder theory of decision-making under asymmetric information. In particular, the stronger the control rights of the owners, the larger and riskier the bank. This is consistent with findings on depositor-owned S&Ls vs. stockholder-owned commercial banks in the US.
In contrast, we find no support for the agency idea that economic performance is better the stronger the control rights of capital providers and the more profit-oriented the firm's objective function. After having accounted for differences in risk, size, fixed firm effects, and fixed industry effects, ownerless banks perform better in crisis times and as well in normal times as banks partially or fully controlled by owners. A study of governance activity in Spanish banks over roughly the same period provides some support to our result, as average ROA was higher in ownerless banks than in stockholder-owned commercial banks (Crespi et al, 2004, table 2) .
Nevertheless, these results do not necessarily falsify the agency prediction that owners who monitor actively create economic value. Neither do they imply that because other disciplining mechanisms than ownership can do the job as efficiently in ownerless firms, owners are redundant in owned firms. The fact that both organizational forms have coexisted in our sample over many years supports this argument. It may reflect Hansmann's (1996) insight that whether or not ownership is the superior organizational form is determined by characteristics of the stakeholder structure and the product market. Therefore, these characteristics determine whether control rights and cash flow rights should be put in the hands of stockholders, other stakeholders, or some combination of the two.
Economic theory would argue that regardless of industry and regardless of stakeholder structure, firms with potential agency problems may survive if there is sufficient disciplining pressure from other sources than ownership. In particular, ownerless firms may be disciplined by mechanisms that are viable alternatives to the lacking monitoring by owners. We find no convincing evidence that this substitute role is played neither by regulation, such as the public banking supervisory, nor by the non-availability of outside equity-financing for ownerless banks. Our evidence suggests that consistent with theoretical predictions (Schmidt, 1997) , product market competition and the threat of lost human capital under bad performance jointly force ownerless firms to establish optimal corporate governance systems. Ownership is not critical for performance when competition is strong.
If the agency problem is taken care of by substitutes for ownership, what remains to rationalize is why the multiple-objective firms in our sample are not losing out to firms with profit maximization as their only goal. Our findings support Allen et al. (2006) on this point, who predict that profits may increase when the firm adopts a multi-dimensional objective function that recognizes the interests of several stakeholders. This suggests corporate governance research may benefit from reconsidering the conventional wisdom on the role of stakeholders in general and stockholders in particular. Panel (a) shows the total number of Norwegian banks (All banks), the number of listed commercial banks, savings banks (non-PCC banks and PCC banks), and listed PCC banks. Panel (b) shows the average industry total assets per bank type for the sample period. Panel (c) shows the the average total assets for an individual bank, its standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum. Non-PCC banks are ownerless foundations (pure savings banks). PCC banks used to be pure savings banks that later transformed themselves into PCC banks by issuing equity securities to the general public in terms of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The figures in panels (b) and (c) are in billion NOK as of year 2002. Panel (a) shows the average interest rates on home building loans and on ordinary deposits for all savings banks and commercial banks. The Interbank rate in panel (b) is the 3 month NIBOR, and the interest rate margin is the difference between the average lending and deposit rate for all banks. We report the estimated regression coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics.
Savings banks

Panel (a): Interest rates on loans and deposits
The dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 (0) if the bank is of the type specified outside (inside) the parenthesis in the column heading. Size is the log of total assets, growth is the growth in total assets from beginning to end of year t. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to customers, or fixes assets. Liability risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We report the log likelihood ratio (LR), the Chi 2 of LR, its probability, the pseudo R 2 , and the number of observations. The regressions control for fixed year effects. We define return on asets (ROA) as net income over total assets. ROA volatility is the standard deviation of annual ROA using a 3-year window around the reported year (t-1, t, t+1). The mean ROA and the ROA volatility are equally weighted across firms, and the average is equally weighted across years. t-values marked with * are statistically different from zero at the 5% level. The table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants as specified in the leftmost column. Performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net income after taxes divided by total assets at year end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to customers, or fixed assets. Liability risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK.
We report the estimated regression coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R 2 , the Wald chi 2 , its p-value, and the number of observations. In the Year dummies row, a yes (no) reflects that we include (do not include) a time dummy to capture time fixed effects. A yes (no) in the Random effects row means that we use (do not use) random effects estimation to capture unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. We report the estimated regression coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R 2 , F-value (Wald chi 2 for random effects regressions) with corresponding p-value, and the number of observations for each regression. The table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants as specified in the leftmost column. The models (a), (b), and (c) represent three alternative ways of handling the panel data structure as specified in the two first rows in the bottom section of the table. Performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net income after taxes divided by total assets at year end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to customers, or fixed assets. Liability risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. This table reestimates the base-case model with size-matched samples in panel (a), and by using the volatility of ROA as a proxy for risk in panel (b). We only include savings bank in panel (a) s that are larger than the smallest commercial bank, while ensuring that the sample has at least as many non-PCC banks as commercial banks. Performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net income after taxes divided by total assets at year end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to customers, or fixed assets. Liability risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk. ROA risk in panel (b) is measured as the standard deviation of ROA over the years t-1, t and t+1. Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK.
Independent
All regressions include year dummies and are estimated with random effects. We report the estimated regression coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R 2 , the Wald chi 2 statistic, its p-value, and the number of observations. Using random firm effects and fixed time effects, this table re-estimates the base-case model under four alternative performance measures, which are specified at the top of each column. Gross return on assets is income before funding costs divided by assets, return on equity is net income divided by book equity, profit margin is net income divided by revenues, and interest rate margin is net interest income divided by assets. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, loans to customers, or fixed assets. Liability risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the larger these two measures, the higher the risk. Size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. We report the estimated regression coefficients in bold and its t-statistic in italics. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R 2 , the Wald chi 2 , its p-value, and the number of observations. Panel (a) reports the mean ownership fraction per firm across five owner types. Panel (b) shows the mean and median ownership fraction for the largest owner and for the five largest owners for PCC banks and commercial banks. We exclude cases where the largest owner holds 90% or more. 
